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The Problem of Choice 




Jaspers’s philosophy is both the negation of every system and the 
affirmation that a system is necessary for the intensity of the life of the 
mind.1 It is constructed out of two propositions that oppose one another (at 
the same time, as we will see, the first proposition will be the basis for the 
second one). Like the world that it describes, it is essentially a philosophy 
torn apart. It is an appeal for the consideration of existence, but also an 
affirmation that this existence is only possible through an unknown 
transcendence. Twice, but in different ways, it is a sort of self-negation. 
Existence is only possible through the objectivity that it negates and through 
the transcendence that negates it, in turn; it takes place between these two 
negations and its value is derived from this place. 
This philosophy, as I will present it here, will be first and foremost a 
reflection on choice and a reflection on transcendence. There are certainly 
many other things to say about this philosophy and many other essential 
points; but it seems justifiable to me precisely to choose what was the most 
striking to me and to deliberately leave in the shadows some elements of the 
universe, or of the multiverse constituted by this philosophy, that could be 
of equal or even greater value for others. 
 
I. The World Torn Apart 
In the Philebus, Plato showed that the idea of the Good can only be grasped 
through various forms and that it is refracted into an irreducible plurality of 
ideas (though these ideas are harmonious). Aristotle insisted on the fact that 
being can be said in many ways (though these ways are analogous). Jaspers 
says that “if I think of a being, it will always be a distinct being but not 
being” (I, 19/59; cf. III, 2/4). Being as a unity is reduced to the empty 
definition of the copula, which is an ambiguous and indeterminate mode of 
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expression (III, 2/4). But these are only very general claims. More precisely, 
Jaspers says that being is either being as an object, being as myself, or being 
in itself. “None of them is absolutely being, none of them can do without the 
other; each of them is a being within being” (I, 6/48).2 But, he adds, we 
cannot find the totality of being. It is neither a common feature, nor an origin 
of all these beings. They repel and attract one another without allowing us to 
contain them in a genus.  
Moreover, each of these worlds is itself torn apart; it can only be seen 
from partial and discontinuous perspectives; neither the scientific world (I, 
19/59, 276/280), nor the world of values, can be unified. The scientific world 
is visible only in isolated fragments (I, 19/59, 276/280). The world of values, 
or the conceptions of the world that become existences, is multiple. “The 
breaking up of authenticity in religious faith and philosophical faith, and of 
these in turn, into a multiplicity of beliefs that are on both sides, is our 
situation here below” (l, 316/314–15). As for the world of existences, which 
is the basis of the two other worlds, it is irreducibly heterogeneous to itself: 
“If I obtain a growing assurance of existence, it is always of my own 
existence and of those with whom I communicate. We are each time 
irreplaceable and not a mere example of a genus of existence” (I, 19/59).3 
“The word or the idea of existence is only a sign indicating to us from which 
side it is necessary to seek this growing personal assurance in a being that is 
objectively neither conceivable nor verifiable …” (I, 19/59–60; cf. 26/66).  
There is thus no generality of being: “Being is not closed in on itself as 
an object” (II, 109/96, cf. 124/108). It is not an object of thought, a system or 
a spectacle (II, 19/18, 206/181). There is no system of existence (I, 276/280).4 
There is no human in general nor divinity in general (I, 316/315). The 
unique God cannot become an objective transcendence for all (III, 118/104, 
123/108). The metaphysical content cannot be understood as an a-temporal 
acquisition which would happen to emerge here or there. It is not an object 
of knowledge; for transcendence is not universal but is always a 
transcendence for an existence (III, 22/21). The more the world is seen truly, 
the more it is seen in a way that is torn apart (II, 253/221). What Jaspers 
highlights first is the essential tearing apart of the world.5  
But this word, this idea of being torn apart, perhaps oversimplifies the 
situation. If I study the relations between being in itself and being in myself, 
I see that the relation between these worlds is ambiguous: the world will 
sometimes appear as something given to me and sometimes as something 
made by me. “If it were entirely one or the other, it would no longer be a 
world” (I, 77/113). It is characterized by these two ways of seeing it, by the 
duality of the interpretations that I can always give to it. 
But this is not yet everything. At the same time as there is a rift in these 
different aspects of reality, there is—as difficult as this statement may be to 
accept, if one accepts the previous one—an encroachment of each one onto 
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the other. Nowhere is this more clearly shown than in the work of a great 
artist, an existential6 artist: the great artistic genius will seek something other 
than conformity to the laws of aesthetics (I, 260/267). What occurs in art can 
be seen everywhere else; and this explains why, within each sphere, there is 
a struggle between content and form, content constantly strives to break 
through the form. There is thus a struggle between philosophy and the form 
of the system; it always stands outside of the system and breaks it (I, 
271/276). And it is precisely because Hegel’s philosophy gives us the feeling 
of a complete triumph over the deficiencies of experience that it is able to 
satisfy us (I, 276/280).7 Thus, philosophy is in a permanent state of tension, 
just like art and all the other great human activities. 
 
II. Existence and the Problem of Choice 
If what we have said about the irreducibility and encroachment of these 
spheres is true, the question of being will thus remain unanswered—unless 
it receives an existential answer based on the plenitude of existence (III, 
37/33–34).8 The negations to which we have been reduced will lead to an 
affirmation: the absence of any rational solution, the absence of any solution 
using simple knowledge will allow and require the activity of my freedom 
(III, 78/69–70). Existence and, in Jaspers’s sense of the term, communication 
are only possible because there is something other than objects.9 “If there 
were nothing indeterminate, there would be no existence for me” (II, 
123/108). “I must will because I do not know; not knowing is the origin of 
having to will” (II, 191/167). The same holds for communication: “There is 
communication only when there is no refuge in, recourse to impersonal 
objectivities, such as the authority of a state or a church, of an objective 
metaphysics, of a definitive moral order, or of an ontological knowledge” (II, 
106/94).10 To make room for belief, it is necessary to destroy knowledge.  
Existence will be the real act of breaking through given reality (II, 8/9). I 
must therefore start from existence, that is, from my own existence. 
“Without doing so, thought and life are lost in what is endless and non-
essential” (I, 25/66). “The elusive assurance of the unconditionality of the 
existent is what gives substance and plenitude” (I, 25/66). This non-
objectifiable part of us is the center of our being.11 
Clearly, there can be no objective or complete idea concerning this 
realm of existence and communication. “The circle of existential experience 
can never become a totality. The thought of a realm of existences, like that of 
a totality of which I would be a member, lacks any basis as a distinct 
thought” (II, 420/364). Similarly, the differences between existences are not 
conceivable by thought, properly speaking: in order for that to be possible, it 
would be necessary for an existence to detach from itself (II, 422/366). Thus 
a philosophy of existences cannot be developed in the form of a 
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monadology. “A monadology that would seek to constitute a knowledge of 
being in its many forms would conflate consciousness in general and 
existence” (II, 432/374). Existences are never visible from an external point 
of view (l, 276/280). 
But we must go further. Can existence, properly speaking, even be 
thought philosophically? Philosophy can only be applied to past existence or 
to future existence; it never applies to existence in the present. “Philosophy 
always arrives late, in order for a reality, which is no longer, to be able to 
know itself and to keep itself in being through memory. Hegel compares it 
to the owl of Minerva which takes flight at dusk. Nietzsche calls it the spark 
that will light new fires” (I, 268/274). Philosophy is either too late or too 
early, either beyond or behind (II, 423/367).  
My understanding cannot know this eternal instant of my existence. “It 
can only be illuminated in the instant and then in a memory full of doubt. I 
never own it like an external possession’ (I, 17/57–58).12 
Existence is thus ungraspable, because there is always a separation, a 
distance between existential reality and thought (I, 47/84–85). The 
proposition “I am an existence” has no meaning, because the being of 
existence is not an objective category under which I can be classified. 
Existence is what I am, not something that I can see or know (II, 16/16, 
22/21). I will only ever see aspects of myself, not my self itself (II, 17/17).13  
Existence will be a perpetual dialectic, in the Kierkegaardian sense of 
the term.14 It will be the transition from one thought to the next.15 There is 
thus not one attitude towards death which can be called the right one, for 
example. Rather, my attitude toward it changes by successive leaps each of 
which marks a stage in my life: “Death changes with me” (II, 229/201). I can 
never have a full or complete view of the Weltanschauung in which I stand 
(II, 242/211–12). “Everything that we have achieved is dead; nothing that we 
have finished can live. As a spectacle for others, a life can have the character 
of something absolute, but in itself, as real, it cannot have that character” (II, 
228/200). For, existence will always be a continual movement [élan]; “being 
in movement is one of the essential characteristics of existence” (III, 125).16 
It will thus be an achievement, but it is an achievement that must never 
destroy the elements over which it triumphs. One who hopes must keep 
despair in oneself, in a way that dominates but does not destroy it. To forget 
this despair would be as bad as getting taken over by it (II, 227/199). 
Existence is thus directed toward transcendence in constantly antinomic 
relationships, in defiance and abandonment, rise and fall, the law of the day 
and the passion of the night (III, 120/106). I constantly pass from one of 
these contraries to the other. 
Moreover, existential consciousness will always be in an antinomic 
tension with itself. There will thus be a tension between subjectivity and 
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objectivity (I, 47/84, 57/93; III, 71/63), not in a union between the two, but 
in the passage from the one to the other. Existence cannot be fulfilled in the 
one or in the other; this would destroy it (II, 348/306); it seeks its path 
through each one in turn; it must always go from one extreme to the other 
extreme and vice versa (II, 337/295). And the objective and the subjective 
will never coincide perfectly. There will always be an inadequation between 
them, arising from a primitive break. Likewise, one would like to imagine a 
synthesis of the world of the day and the world of the night. The world of 
the day is a world of virile chosen tasks, while the world of night is one of 
passionate sacrifice; but this synthesis cannot be accomplished in any 
existence; each of these two worlds is unconditional; a synthesis of the two 
could not occur without betraying them both (III, 113/99–100).17 
The existent lives in a constant antinomy, because it must relativize 
everything that appears and yet be identical with one of these appearances 
whose relativity is known (II, 124/109). It thus knows itself both as absolute 
and as relative, and the tension between the consciousness of the self as 
absolute and the consciousness of the self as relative is what Jaspers calls the 
historical character of being (Geschichtlichkeit; II, 122/107). It is here that 
what I have called the problem of choice arises. One cannot accept any point 
of view as valid objectively, and yet one always has to hold on to some point 
of view (II, 124/109). Objectively, everything is relative; existentially, I am in 
the absolute (II, 419/364). 
In historical consciousness, I am aware both of the passage of time as 
appearance and of eternal being; I am aware of both in one; eternity is 
absolutely related to this instant (II, 126/110). Inasmuch as I act in time in an 
unconditional way or love in an unconditional way, eternity is in time. What 
is evanescent in the instant is yet eternal, and that is existence (I, 17/57-58).18 
Another way to formulate this fact that I am always in a union between 
the eternal and circumstances is to say that I find myself always in a 
situation.19 I can never get out of one situation without entering into another 
one (II, 203/178). I will not dwell here on the general theory of situations. 
What I want to note is that I can never be fully conscious of my situation. 
This idea is related to the elusiveness of existence, and to another idea of 
Jaspers, according to which there can only be true clarity if this clarity stands 
out against an obscure background. One’s awareness of the rules changes 
both the situation and these rules. The fact that I am in situations is thus not 
a fact that I can consider from the outside; it is in no way an object of sight 
(II, 203/178, 206/181). 
By the fact that I exist, I am bound to circumstances; I do things that are 
foreign to my own substance; the heterogeneous is tied to me in an 
indissoluble way (III, 47/42). These things are given to me through my place 
within the historical current of the real. This gives rise, for example, to the 
deep relationship between a given thinker’s vision of the world and the 
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history of different visions of world, the relationship between philosophy 
and the history of philosophy. What I am, I am in an intimate union with 
what historically awakens me to existence.20 I am something that only 
happens once (I, 283/286). My character as a historical being derives 
precisely from the thought of this whole in which I have a place and from 
the thought of this One that I am. Does the whole have any other means of 
expression than to unite with all the different ‘ones’? (I, 283/286) 
But, alongside these changing situations which pass into one another, 
there exist also other situations. There exist fundamental situations (for the 
time being, this is how we will translate the word Grenzsituation, or limit-
situation), which are inescapable.21 “Situations like these—‘I am always in 
situations, I cannot live without struggle and pain, I cannot avoid sin, I must 
die’—these are what I call limit-situations. They are like a wall we run into, a 
reef which we get trapped in. We cannot change them but only bring them 
into greater clarity, without explaining them or deducing them from 
something else. They are one with Dasein itself” (II, 203/178). 
 These situations, more than any others, go beyond any objective 
insight, and this is what Jaspers meant by saying that they are not situations 
for consciousness in general (II, 203/178–79). We can only feel them and 
immerse ourselves in them. “We react to limit-situations, therefore, not by 
following the plan of a calculated activity, thanks to which one would be 
able to overcome them, but by a radically different kind of activity. We 
become ourselves by entering into limit-situations with open eyes” (II, 
204/179). The feeling of limit-situations is thus linked to the feeling of 
existence.22 To experience limit-situations and to exist are one and the same 
thing. As we shall see, to exist is to commit the sin of limitation, and to have 
the feeling of helplessness (II, 204/179).23 
Through these given situations, we can become aware of our freedom. 
Without doubt, here again, we are outside of the domain of the objective: 
freedom exists only for freedom; because it alone can raise questions about 
the subject of freedom; and the fact that it questions its own existence gives 
us an answer to the subject of this existence (II, 176/154–55).  
There is freedom because I have to choose: freedom is the choice that 
comes from what could be called the narrowness of existence. I cannot pay 
attention to everything, nor expect everything, but I have to act (II, 180/158, 
185/162).24 As Marcel says in his article on Jaspers, there are radical 
options.25 
The question that I would have to ask myself would therefore be: How 
should I be in order to be myself? or, as Jaspers says: What is it that unifies 
me? Where is the One to be found for me? (II, 334/290–91).26 I have to 
choose between the possibilities of existence. There are infinitely many 
unities; they are in conflict, but someone who knows them all does not 
participate in them. Instead, it is someone who identifies with one of them, 
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who plunges passionately into the contemplation of one aspect of things, 
who is passionately limited to one thought. “If there were only the struggle 
of being against non-being, of the true against the false, of the good against 
evil, there would be one single movement in Dasein. But the multiplicity of 
existences gives rise to the pathos of a situation: existence does not fight 
against a lack of existence, but against existence; and this other existence has 
its own depth” (II, 437/379). 
Here we can see more clearly than ever that Hegelian idealism and 
positivism are unsatisfactory; they are both philosophies which serve 
generality and destroy the individual (II, 231/202–203). It is necessary to go 
beyond them in order to see what will truly be a Weltanschauung: this is a 
view of the world, but a view of the world by an individual, by an 
individual who chooses this view. Or rather, one does not choose it as a 
view among other possible views; one does not see it as a possibility among 
other possibilities; for this would make it relative and thereby deny its very 
essence. “When I know a point of view as a point of view, it is no longer my 
Weltanschauung.” So, to call a Weltanschauung by name is to classify it among 
others and thus to distort it. Any label falsifies it, any abstract classification 
destroys its specificity (II, 243/213). Since I cannot escape from the truth that 
is the possibility of my existence in order to observe it, I can only say that 
there are multiple truths (II, 417/362).27 Weltanschauungen, in the plural, are 
no longer authentic Weltanschauungen. They are transformed into pure 
potentialities (I, 250–54).28 It is impossible to know multiple truths which are 
mutually exclusive in their unconditionality (II, 417/362), just as I cannot 
compare my existence with other existences or place existences alongside 
one another (II, 420/365). Existences are not parts or members of a knowable 
whole (I, 265/270); there is thus no universal point of view from which a 
Weltanschauung would become visible (I, 245/254). The person stands, from 
the beginning, within a specific Weltanschauung (I, 242/252; II, 422/366), 
more precisely, one is this Weltanschauung (I, 244/254). “I cannot step 
outside of this truth. I cannot look at it, and I cannot know it. If I departed 
from it, I would fall into the void” (II, 417/361–62). The relationship that I 
have with it must be a relationship of fidelity.29 
One cannot, strictly speaking, even say that this is a choice.30 For 
example, religion and philosophy are not two possibilities placed in a row 
and between which I can choose. “I am only aware of the decision when I 
already have chosen a side, when I am already standing on one of the two 
sides.” Religion cannot be seen from the point of view of philosophy nor 
philosophy from the point of view of religion. The philosopher can only see 
absurdity in the respect for religious authority; at the same time, the 
philosopher will be aware of committing a contradiction (I, 308/307–308). 
For example, the philosopher will have to submit either to the law of the day 
or to the passion of the night. Each of these is unconditional; they cannot be 
synthesized. One must choose either one or the other, unconditionally. “It is 
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impossible at the same time to have the life of the day and the depth of the 
night” (III, 113/99–100).31 
To the extent that one is faithful to one’s own point of view, it is difficult 
to see what the other can see clearly from another point of view. “Once they 
have made their decision, they can no longer see the other side as it really is” 
(I, 308/308). There are thus never two ways set out in front of me that I 
could recognize and choose between. To represent things in this way is to 
drop existential life into the paralysis of the sphere of objectivity (III, 
114/100, 138/121).32 
It is thus not a matter of choosing but of taking up resolutely what one 
is. The choice consists in the fact that one sees who one is and recognizes 
oneself (I, 300/302). Every choice presupposes a kind of a priori, which is the 
ground of myself. The latest goal we are aware of is never the ultimate goal. 
The will encounters its limits everywhere; it is encased, its clarity is 
surrounded by a grey zone from which the will derives its power. “If this 
ground that carries it were to succumb, if the finite end is taken as absolute, 
then mechanization intervenes” (II, 158/140).33 We cannot be aware of this 
absolute background against which we will. “The will to will has neither a 
plan nor means. It is without ground, and without purpose (II, 162/144). 
How can we choose between unconditionals, if not by what we are? (I, 
258/265). 
Perhaps there will appear to be a duality between my essential self and 
my self that is made by historical circumstances. And, indeed, it is necessary 
to think this duality (II, 122/107). “In contemplative thought, I can reach the 
Archimedean point from which I can see and know what is. With an 
independence that is astonishing, albeit empty, I even face my own Dasein as 
if it were something foreign” (II, 204/179). Gabriel Marcel has already noted 
that this contemplation has a relation to that of Valéry, but for Jaspers, as 
Marcel also noted, it can only be an instant. This thought must be destroyed: 
“The paradoxical duality of historical consciousness exists for thought alone; 
for existential consciousness, it is something that is essentially one” (II, 
122/107). I must know myself not in my independence, but in my 
connection with circumstances. “In the limit-situation, transcending any 
thought that I can grasp, I first experience myself as shaken and then as one 
with the fate which I have taken to be mine” (II, 217/191). This unity should 
not be conceived as something posterior to my essence. 
It is here that the idea of Fate regains its value. As Kant said, it has no 
legitimacy for those who want to judge things from the point of view of 
experience and reason. But, for someone who is placed in a limit-situation, 
the idea of fate recovers its meaning. Its validity cannot be demonstrated as 
a concept, but one can live through it as an experience (II, 217/191). 
This also lends full value to the Nietzschean idea of the love of Fate. It 
signifies the indissolubility of the link that attaches me to a situation. “In 
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action, I do not simply remain for myself an other in relation to situations 
into which I would have arrived from the outside. Without them, I would be 
nothing more than an empty representation; it is in them that I am myself” 
(II, 217/190–91).34 
Just as a Weltanschauung must be narrow in order to be deep, the same 
holds true for communication. By this, Jaspers means that I destroy 
communication when I try to establish it with as many beings as possible. “If 
I want to do justice to all those whom I encounter, I fill my being with 
superficialities. For the sake of an imaginary universal possibility, I renounce 
the possibility of a historical being that is unique in its limitations” (II, 
60/55). “The one who says that one should be not too devoted to one 
specific person or to one specific cause, but give one’s action a broad base by 
loving many people and many things, is someone who is not touched by the 
One and takes the positivity of multiple Dasein as the absolute” (III, 
118/104).35 I exist in a way that is all the more decisive and intense, when I 
integrate myself in the irreducible historical character of my situation (II, 
213/186). As Jaspers puts it, unconditionality in historicity is the nobility of 
existence. 
“What could at first be thought of as the limitation of my finite existence 
is the possibility of its fulfillment … What seemed objectively to be a 
limitation, a shrinking, and a narrowness, becomes an impenetrable depth, 
becomes being itself, becomes the unique reality of existence” (II, 122/107, 
213/187, 219/192). The depth of being is revealed by exclusivity; existential 
unity is, first of all, limitation (III, 177). The objectively and quantitatively 
finite character of existence is existentially, qualitatively, its infinite 
character.36 
Does not what we have indicated show that existence, not by choice but 
by its being, must close itself off from certain possibilities, limit itself, and 
thereby be in a state of sin? Existence lives in dilemmas and alternatives. It is 
thereby tied to sin. 
One of the origins of Jaspers’s theory is clearly his reflection on 
passionate Weltanschauungen, in particular that of a Kierkegaard. Jaspers 
cannot affirm their truth, but he can affirm their intensity and authenticity. 
Jaspers’s reflection on Kierkegaard led to the idea that the depth of a 
doctrine is limitation. His reflection on sin, which also stems in part from a 
reflection on Kierkegaard, leads him to say that sin is limitation. Depth is 
limitation and limitation is sin.37 To become deeper by limiting oneself 
passionately and to become deeper by becoming aware of sin—these are 
almost two different ways of expressing the same truth. These are two 
essential teachings drawn from Kierkegaard and Jaspers was able to forge 
them into one and the same idea.  
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The negative is a condition for the positive, limitation is a condition for 
the unconditional; just as the lack of a system is the condition for value and 
the will.38 This is not a theodicy; or rather, this theodicy is presented in the 
form of an a-theodicy. It is the lack of a unity, a truth, and a universal good 
which is the condition for the value of the world. In a sense, one might say 
that faith only exists for the atheist.39 
The original wound is the source of my highest possibility. If the natural 
is turned into the supreme standard, then one can say that the human is a 
sickness of nature through which nature exceeds itself (II, 298/260). The 
human is always “fragmentary” and breaking [en rupture] with Dasein. It 
cannot be completed in a harmonious totality. Its goals are never reached. It 
is in an essentially contradictory situation; it can neither completely 
accommodate Dasein nor let it completely escape. Its world is shattered, and 
its own self is broken. And it is this characteristic, this fact that the human 
being is a broken being, that makes unconditionality possible and makes it 
possible to devote oneself to freely set goals as absolutes (II, 296/258).40 
We don’t choose our place in this struggle, because we are this place 
itself; and, we do not know the meaning of the struggle. “No one knows 
ultimately what this fight is about” (II, 403/351). We do not know what will 
result in the case of victory or what will result in the case of defeat. We do 
not know when the fight is bad or good (II, 374/326). Even if we choose the 
day, we are choosing in the dark. Even when we fight for the day, we are 
fighting in the dark.  
This is why the ultimate truth is modesty, respect for attitudes that are 
not one’s own, respect for the other, and for the pain of sin (III, 113/100).41 
 
III. Transcendence 
1. Transcendence and Immanence 
Existence is indeed tied to being for Jaspers just as much as it is for 
Heidegger. But, as we have seen from the outset, the being it seeks can only 
be a lost being, a disjointed being (III, 2/4). Existence is ontological, but 
Jaspers’s ontology begins with a failure. And the failure of ontology gives 
me access to existence, that is, to my existence. “The desire for an ontology 
disappears and changes into a desire to gain through my personality the 
being that I can never acquire by knowledge”—it is through existence that I 
will go towards transcendence (III, 160/140–41).42 By having lost being, false 
being, I find true being, the existence which leads to transcendence. 
Existence leads to transcendence, first of all, in the sense that I know 
that I did not give being to myself. I am given to myself (III, 4/6). “When I 
return to myself, to my authentic self, in the obscurity of my original will, 
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then what is revealed to me is that wherever I am completely myself I am 
not only myself” (II, 199/174). What I am surprises myself. Thus, when I 
philosophize, I stay in a state of suspense in the tension between my 
possibilities and this characteristic of being given, which is my reality (III, 
152/133). 
The philosophical clarity that we are seeking is, as we have already 
anticipated, a deep clarity, that is to say a clarity that implies obscure depths, 
a dark background on which it rests (I, 322/319).43 Clarity is not built out of 
nothingness; it does not support itself. It reveals “what will lastingly, and 
thus intrinsically, defy understanding” (I, 324/321). And in the study of 
transcendence, we recover this link between clarity and obscurity: “the 
being of transcendence is not only being, but being and its other. The other is 
obscurity, the ground, matter, nothingness” (III, 48/43).44 
Existence is thus not absolute being since it is not self-sufficient. 
“Existence makes me feel that it is not the absolute. In response to the 
question of whether it is absolute, it replies either with anxiety, in the 
awareness of its incomplete and open character, just like its relation with the 
dark ground that we call the other, or else it replies with an attitude of 
defiance, inasmuch as it denies what is not itself” (I, 26/67).45 To say that 
existence is not self-enclosed (I, 27/67), is to say that it is intentionality, as 
the phenomenologists would say. It is directed toward the other and toward 
the self; it is directed toward itself by grasping its own Dasein (I, 27/67). 
Each time that I act as an existent, I refer to a being that I am not in any way, 
I relate to an other (see III, 122/108). The self is essentially in connection 
with the heterogeneous. In the self, “something foreign in its meaning is 
taken into a spiritual system” (III, 47/42). Existence exists only insofar as it 
relates to another existence or to transcendence (II, 2/5). 
Existence is directed towards transcendence, because “it incessantly 
leads us toward a more profound opening. Its authentic being consists in the 
search for transcendence” (I, 27/67).46 
I know the otherness within me by the way I am given to myself. All my 
own clarity stands out against a dark background, and all my “choices” are 
made against an invincible givenness. I know the other who faces me 
through my activity in the world. I know the other above me because I am 
directed towards transcendence. I am always in connection with the other. 
When I think deeply, I am always at the limit of myself. 
The place of transcendence will be the form or the limit (III, 13/13, 
16/16, 17/17, 110/96–97), the limit of the non-object and the object, as well 
as the passage from the one to the other (I, 4/48), the limit of the day and the 
night (III, 110/90), but especially beyond these limits which remain within 
existence, the limit of existence and transcendence—on the basis of which 
existence can see the other without possessing it (I, 39/77). 
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At this limit, existence feels in touch with something that is for it 
nothing but a limit; divinity exists only as limit (III, 122/107). This helps us 
to understand more deeply the idea of a limit-situation. Jaspers calls 
fundamental situations “limit-situations,” because there is another reality 
beyond them, but this other reality is not in Dasein for consciousness. Limit-
situations indicate transcendence (II, 203/178, 204/179). 
We will thus never be able to grasp the transcendent, as if it gathered 
beings into a whole or were the series of all their aspects. Indeed, there is no 
passage from the conception of one existence to that of another existence: 
“Existences are never only themselves and are never images for others. They 
do not become aspects; it is for them that there are aspects” (I, 441/382). This 
separation between existences makes it impossible for the idea of 
transcendence to be a unity, at least a rational unity between existences. 
As a result, we are led to the idea of an absolute separation between 
existence and transcendence. “Existence is the reality that keeps its distance 
and refuses identification with transcendence. Here, in the greatest 
proximity, what is revealed in the clearest way is absolute distance” (III, 
65/58–59). And, meanwhile, in this proximity and at the time of their closest 
junction, the divinity maintains an absolute distance; it is never identical to 
me (III, 122/107). Existence is thus located close to the divinity but in front 
of it.47 This essential duality is invincible for temporal beings (I, 20/60). 
There is thus a sharp contrast between existence and transcendence. 
Immanence is the domain of the multiple; to the contrary, transcendence is 
the domain of being-one that I can call both over-being and non-being (III, 
37/34). Existence is the domain of limits and conditions (III, 65/58), while 
transcendence is the unlimited and unconditioned. Existence is the domain 
of communication; transcendence is what exists independently from 
everything else (III, 65/58). Existence is self-present; transcendence is 
unapproachable (I, 20/60). Existence first appeared to us as the realm of 
possibility;48 but there is also a realm where possibilities cease and that is 
how we can define transcendence. No oppositions can be maintained in 
transcendence (III, 115/101). It is a reality without possibilities; we can no 
longer interrogate it. “For the reality of transcendence, there is no possibility 
of being retranslated into possibility. This is why it is not empirical reality. If 
it has no possibility, it is not because of a lack, but because this division 
between possibility and reality is the lack that characterizes empirical 
reality, which always has an otherness outside of it” (III, 9/10). 
Transcendence is not existence any more than it is an empirical reality; 
because in transcendence, there are no longer any decisions: “it is where I 
run up against reality without any possibility of changing it into a 
possibility. There I encounter transcendence; there I encounter being” (III, 
9/10). Here there is no other possibility but what is; the problem of choice is 
destroyed in transcendence (III, 51/46).49 
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The One as a limit, transcendent unity, is thus the One that I am not in 
any way. But yet, I act in relation to this being when I act towards myself as 
my authentic self (III, 122/108). I create myself by the way in which I 
perceive transcendence.50 Existence and transcendence are heterogeneous, 
but they are related to one another. The human is the being that strives to 
reach beyond itself; the human is not sufficient for itself: “Though humanity 
is what is fascinating to humans, the human is not the supreme thing. The 
human is a concern for oneself, but only because one is concerned with 
something other. … One never finds rest in oneself, but only with the being 
of transcendence” (III, 165/145). Existence is in relation to transcendence or 
else it is nothing at all (III, 6/7). One could say that it is only present to itself 
through its reaching towards something that is missing from it (I, 31/67). 
And, moreover, it is because I am the being that I am that I can be sure of 
transcendence (III, 123/108). 
Yet, it should not be said that transcendence depends on me. The 
historical character of my existence does not produce transcendence. “Even 
though it is only real for existence, existence cannot act toward 
transcendence as if it were a being that is only real for itself” (III, 22/21).  
It remains the case that the consciousness of existence and the 
consciousness of transcendence are linked. “By the fact that I am given to 
myself, I am aware both of my freedom in existence and of my necessity in 
transcendence” (II, 199/174).  
In fact, since we have seen that, even in the domain of existence, choice 
always presupposes a non-choice, the multiple presupposes a unity, an 
unconditioned, an unlimited, we could complete Jaspers’s indications by 
suggesting that these two domains are continuous with one another. It is 
only through their schemas that they somehow become separated. In 
themselves, they are intimately united, even more than Jaspers says. Finally, 
the distinctions that we have made between them almost seem to vanish, 
without however leading to the disappearance of the idea that existence 
reaches toward its other. 
2. Negative Ontology 
According to what has been said, the One should not be sought where 
the idealists and positivists sought it: it will not be revealed in the form of 
one world or one truth (III, 121/106). By the fact that they only conceive a 
single truth, they are unable to maintain the historical character of reality as 
fundamental, and they place communication in the background (III, 
217/191).51 It is not through an eternal truth that we will communicate with 
each other. “To define the true divinity as that which can universally unite 
mankind is to banalize transcendence.” “To live in abstract universality is to 
lose transcendence” (III, 123/108). Each individual will only arrive at 
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transcendence by focusing on what is most personal about his or her own 
vision of the world.  
There is only really existential communication when there is a mutual 
awakening, a contact, or a connection between truths that are irreducible to 
each other. It is because the divinity remains hidden that existences join 
hands and depend on one another (III, 218/191). 
But transcendence will neither be the truth nor beauty. For beauty does 
not include the destructive element which can sometimes characterize 
transcendence; it destroys unity and takes hold of me in order to destroy me 
and push me into my nothingness (III, 120/104).  
 In reality, the One cannot be expressed, because any expression 
particularizes and externalizes it (III, 118/104–105). The divinity remains 
beyond every aspect, and that is why polytheism is essentially in error. The 
unique divinity exists as a limit; it remains absolutely unknown (III, 
122/108). 
Here we are moving into the region of not knowing. There is a modesty 
attached to not knowing that is due to the inability of existence to express 
itself completely (II, 287/228).52 And there is also a passion of this not 
knowing. Jaspers stresses the effort of consciousness to annihilate itself (III, 
51/47), the passion of a thought which tends towards its own destruction 
(III, 38/35), and this movement of thought to suppress itself (III, 137/120).53 
Its lucidity is great enough that it becomes eager for its failure. It is in this 
not knowing that the authentic person enters into relation to transcendence. 
This person’s growing self-assurance is what we have studied under the 
name of an existence that is fueled by the flame of not knowing. There is 
something incomprehensible hidden from me in the brightest light as well as 
in the darkest abyss; transcendence appears in this not knowing (II, 
263/230). By renouncing knowledge, I trust, I deliver myself to, and I bind 
myself to the very foundation of being (III, 78/70).54 
This is not to say that there is no thought here. Consciousness does not 
give in lazily to the forces of feeling; it is directed toward the extreme in 
order to be able to think with the greatest possible clarity (III, 78/70). 
Thought does not surrender itself, because it transcends (III, 38/35). If there 
is no representation or thought, the divinity can only exist through our not-
knowing (III 124/112). The incomprehensible is wholly enriched by the 
understanding that precedes it and is, in a sense, internal to it. All of our 
knowledge is essential to our not-knowing (III, 169/148);55 not-knowing 
only gets its value from all the knowledge that it presupposes and denies (II, 
261/229). Its content is the thought of failure, but it is a failure preceded by a 
long series of victories. I can neither think this absolute being nor renounce 
thinking it (III, 38/35), and thought remains in a dialectical state where the 
non-thought is constantly directed toward thought. This is, properly 
speaking, neither a thought of something nor a thought of nothing (III, 
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39/36). There are representations and thoughts, but they vanish (III, 
124/109). 
We arrive at a thought through which one tries to think the unthinkable 
and even to represent it in thought (III, 38/35). There is a thinking non-
thought through which I come into contact with the Other (II, 263/229), a 
thought that is filled by the non-thought (II, 11/12). These are some of the 
formulas Jaspers uses in order to help us grasp this radical change in our 
vision, this obscure light into which we are entering. 
The being of transcendence is what is thought in Not-Being-Able-To-
Think, as what is part of oneself but is not for me (III, 323). 
How can I arrive at this thought of the non-thought? First, by means of 
the symbol. The metaphysical symbol is the objectification of something that 
cannot be objective. The symbol does not need to be conceived as having an 
intellectual content, but as an image that has a non-formulaic relation with 
something transcendent, as being at the same time itself and this other thing 
(III, 16/16). Then, there is the collapse of logic. One will have recourse to 
abstract thoughts that are suppressed in their very use (II, 2/4). One will use 
contradictory expressions that point beyond themselves toward the intuition 
that they seek to express and prevent a fixation and objective definition of 
existence. Unity and duality, temporal existence and eternity, 
communication and existence, are already joined paradoxically in the self (II, 
11–13/12–14). This is especially the case in the domain of transcendence. The 
collapse of logic will occur when thought becomes aware of the circle in 
which it moves, of the tautologies it expresses, of its words which, strictly 
speaking, say nothing (III, 15/15, 233/205), or even of its internal 
contradictions. We will show how each one of these categories calls for the 
opposite category, and thus is destroyed, just as Plato did in his Parmenides 
(III, 46/42). And, through this awareness of its self-contradiction, thought 
will ensure the destruction of its own objectivity (III, 16/17). Finally, there 
remains the method of transcendence properly speaking. One elevates a 
category to the rank of the absolute, such as the category of necessity. Then, 
one takes away the characteristic features of this category; necessity thus 
ceases to be conceived as causal or logical. We then arrive at the idea of a 
self-cause, the idea of the foundation of being in being. The determinate thus 
becomes indeterminate (III, 40/36), and the category breaks against the 
absolute, ceases to be thinkable, and ceases to exist.56 
We thereby arrive at a sort of contact with what is properly 
incomprehensible about the substance of being. Existence runs up against 
the incomprehensibility of the being in and through which it authentically 
exists (III, 154/134).57 
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3. The Appearances of the One: Unity — Multiplicity, Passage — 
Eternity 
In the domain of transcendence, one can only ask transcendent 
questions, ones that have no answer. The real is then led to its full existential 
presence; there is no longer any possibility or objectivity. We are in the 
presence of a “that’s the way it is” (III, 134/117). We are in the presence of 
what others have called a mystery. 
We will see this in particular for the problem of the one and the many, 
which is the final form of what we initially called the problem of choice. 
Everyone relates with unity as it appears to them. But what are the relations 
between these unities, between the different and opposed aspects of the 
unity that we perhaps do not even have the right to call aspects without 
falsifying them? What is the relationship between the One and the many 
Ones? “The One,” Jaspers says, “is a multiple One, inasmuch as each one of 
us, as different from the others, is the unconditional element in existence” 
(II, 334/294). That is to say that the one is incarnated differently for each one 
of us. Each absolute is always a different absolute. And Jaspers continues: 
“in each essential situation, we can speak of ‘the one thing that is needed,’ 
but it is not able to become the object of a universal knowledge for which the 
present is a particular case: it is that in which each existence is realized” (II, 
334/294). Each of these Ones is intense and has an internal relation to an 
existence. Jaspers insists that each has this characteristic of historical being 
(II, 334/294). As a result, transcendence is not something more general than 
existence. Quite the contrary, “transcendence is incomparable and 
absolutely historical. Here the historical reaches its supreme degree of 
historicity.” The parable of the three rings, which Lessing tells, thus does not 
provide a fair assessment of our situation.58 There is not one truth whose 
various aspects would come to be known; there is an unthinkable union 
between uniqueness and generality that is affirmed in opposing and 
irreconcilable forms (III, 25/22). 
Each one can only see the one divinity whose one light comes toward 
him (III, 118/104). “… the one God is always my God. It is only as an 
exclusive One that He is near me. I do not have Him in common with 
others” (III, 121/107). 
How can we combine these two ideas of an existence that is dedicated 
to unity, experiences unity unconditionally, and yet knows that this unity is 
only its own unity?59 For the intellect, there is a fundamental paradox in the 
idea of existential truth: “That truth is unique and yet in relation with other 
truths; there seem to be many truths, and yet there is only one truth” (II, 
419/364). 
The problem of the One and the Many cannot be resolved in purely 
intellectual terms. And if we let go of this domain, we can find feelings of 
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identity behind the intellectual differences; in a sense, behind its many 
masks, existence always remains the same (II, 424/369). Although its forms 
are infinitely diverse, the truth of existence is not multiple (II, 417/362). To 
say so would be to contemplate it from outside. Here one reaches an 
unthinkable unity. And, between the forms of this unthinkable unity, there 
is communication. “Everything here can be one, not as an immediate 
possession but as the complete and incommunicable course of a path, that is, 
the path that existence travels together with existence” (I, 278/282). And, in 
effect, although transcendence in a sense is outside of communication (I, 
278/282), there is communication between these different and sometimes 
opposed Ones: “the distant, absolutely inaccessible One makes me seek 
communication with the most distant things”; the flame of my existence is 
kindled by contact with the flame of other existences (I, 312/311).  
Beyond this communication, what explains it is the inexplicable and 
incommunicable. At the same time as there must be choice and decision in 
transcendence, we know that oppositions vanish in transcendence (III, 
115/101). 
This brings us back to the same problem, not from the point of view of 
existence, but from the point of view of transcendence, which, properly 
speaking, is unthinkable. Everything happens here as if transcendence were 
reflected and echoed in irreducibly many existences. “If the true Being is 
One, but in such a way that any knowledge of this One is already falsified, 
then as something temporal in the here and now it must only appear as 
awakening from one limited individual to another limited individual” (I, 
283/286). There is a single source of these broken rays. But, we cannot see it 
any more than we can stare at the sun. 
Light only really exists for us in its state of refraction. Yet, this state of 
refraction, in turn, only exists if we look at the rays coming toward us as the 
presence of all light. 
Jaspers made an effort, which at times might be considered desperate, 
to maintain both the unity of the one and its breakup into heterogeneous 
existential visions. “It would be hubris to take my God as the only God” (III, 
122/107). “Even in struggle, existence wants to see the other’s link with God. 
God is my God as much as my enemy’s God” (III, 122/107). “Tolerance 
becomes positive in a will for boundless communication and then the 
renunciation of this communication in its awareness of the fatal character of 
struggle” (III, 122/107). I know both that everything coincides in the 
absolute and that a decision must be made here in favor of one of its aspects 
and against another one of them (III, 122/108). God is both near and distant. 
In focusing my eyes on the God who is near, I cannot lose sight of the distant 
God. “It is only beyond the aspect of forms whose forces are fighting in the 
world here below that the one God can be found” (III, 122/107).60 “In its 
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closest proximity, the unique divinity maintains its absolute distance” (III, 
122/107).61 
This “communication in struggle” does not weaken the struggle.62 But 
Jaspers asks us to believe this more than he explains it.  
Here we are presented with an ultimate problem, or rather, with the 
ultimate problem. Transcendence does not have the universality of the 
truths that consciousness thinks in general; it must be beyond the historicity 
that characterizes existence; it is the particular-universal (Einzigallgemein), 
the unthinkable unity of the particular and the universal (III, 23/21). “The 
paradox of transcendence lies in the fact that it can only be grasped 
historically but cannot be thought adequately as being historical itself” (III, 
23/21). This is not the concrete universal of Hegelianism, nor is it abstract 
generality or particularity. It is not understanding or extension, but 
intensity. It is linked to the existing individual with its twofold character of 
being violently abstracted from everything and of being intensely concrete 
in itself. 
For human beings, the One is essentially torn apart; that is to say, it is 
only visible by its rays, each of which cannot be seen unless one is blind to 
the others. In addition, we will see that the One is essentially fugitive. Each 
of these rays is evanescent. Through these two characteristics of breaking 
apart and the evanescence of the One, Jaspers’s philosophy is opposed to 
Hegel’s. He does not think that what has been acquired remains acquired 
and that truths are like some sort of snowball. Instead, they are snow that is 
constantly in the process of melting away. “In the great adventure of 
humankind, it is a matter of knowing if, how and to what extent the truth 
can last” (III, 373). The good has no consistency (II, 273; III, 19/18, 67/60). In 
fact, it is only what is relative that can be consistent and stable for us; 
absolute being is for us an evanescent state (I, 253). This reversal is essential 
to our situation. “What is stable is nothingness, and what is evanescent is the 
appearance of being” (I, 253). 
But this fact is nothing but what we have called the historical character 
of being (I, 253; III, 19/18). This deep historicity is both the cause and effect 
of the tearing apart of existence as well as its evanescence. Not only does 
existence come into itself in the vanishing of what is simply given (III, 15/15, 
51/47); but it can also be said that it only enters into oneself through the 
vanishing of oneself. 
That is the most profound aspect of what Jaspers calls the passion of the 
night. It is the opposite of the law of the day, which is the law of duration 
and consistency: “The night teaches us that everything that is given must be 
destroyed. Nothing authentic can last as a permanent acquisition. What is 
accomplished is also what vanishes. For the temporal being, the ultimate 
possibility is to become real and then to falter. It comes out of the night and 
sinks back into it” (III, 110/97). 
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IV. The World of Ciphers: Failure, The Instant, The Miracle 
We will never be able to see transcendence itself, but only its traces, 
contradictory and vanishing traces, that can barely even enter into space or 
endure in time. We will not be able to see transcendence as a universal 
certainty, but as an ambiguous belief (III, 67/60). It resides, as we have said, 
in the vanishing of the object and in the act of vanishing itself. From this, it 
follows that transcendence cannot be revealed as an object, but only as 
posited indirectly, so to speak, about existence (III, 138/120). It is presented 
in the form of symbols, myths (our thoughts on evil can only be expressed 
through myths—III, 73/65), in a cipher [chiffré] language whose ciphers 
themselves are disappearing in the sense that they do not have the stability 
of objects for consciousness (III, 15/15). This is what Jaspers calls 
transcendent immanence, an immanence whose immanence vanishes and a 
transcendence whose transcendence tends to vanish (III, 136/119). Authentic 
being is reached where there is also the maximum oscillation of thought; for, 
it can only be reached in the most fleeting way (III, 162/142). 
This world of ciphers is no more one world than the other worlds; it is 
no more a system than they are. Each of the ciphers reveals totality and 
unity (III, 138/121). I will therefore have to choose how I will read the 
universe. Once again, we thus encounter the idea that there are different 
conceptions of the world. Like any worldview, the reader of cipher script 
always remains historical and concrete (III, 215), chosen, that is to say, in 
essence, dictated. “The question is to know whether I accept the 
psychoanalytical reading or the logico-dialectic reading of Hegel, and not to 
know whether the one or the other is right. For they are neither true nor 
false. It is not by understanding or empirical observation that I am 
convinced here, but by what I am. The question is to know which cipher 
language is the most existentially true or existentially ruinous” (III, 148/129–
30). It is a matter of eliminating the shallow meanings in order to go toward 
deeper meanings. “In transcendence, I only attain that which I become 
myself. If I reduce and extinguish myself to the point of becoming the 
universal consciousness which Idealism talks about, then transcendence 
disappears. If I grasp it, it remains for me the being that is the only being 
and that remains what it is without me” (III, 150/132). It is only by existing 
deeply that I can attain something beyond myself. Jaspers thereby follows 
the path of Kierkegaard and unites the ideas of transcendence and existence. 
Perhaps a similar effort and result can be found in Heidegger’s philosophy. 
The great systems become ciphers, expressions of the movement [élan] 
of existence;63 they are myths. The error of the metaphysicians is to 
substantialize this movement towards transcendence, to turn it into beings 
(this results in dogmas, like those of the fall and of creation, III, 205/179). 
This is also to believe that one can re-descend from the being of 
transcendence to the cipher, instead of being confined to it, one can take 
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hold of it (III, 206/180). We can only climb, but not descend. The descending 
dialectic is impossible. For existential philosophy, there will always be this 
tearing apart of being that we have noted from the outset (III, 217/191). 
What being is, abstracting from Dasein, is inaccessible to us (II, 214, 215/188). 
What is true in ciphers is their way of expressing our own feelings of 
expansion and decline; it is existence as a way of expressing transcendence 
(III, 206/180). 
So, when I am asked or ask myself about transcendence from the point 
of view of consciousness in general, I can only respond negatively. If the 
question is raised from the point of view of existence, then I can respond. 
But this answer will not consist of general propositions; it will reside in the 
movement of existential communication, that is, in my way of behaving (III, 
156/136). That is why, if someone asks me about my belief, I can only 
answer: “I do not know if I believe.”64 
 We can now see the construction of an entire world of ciphers, starting 
with the cipher of nature, that is, of the earth, with which I am so profoundly 
united (Die Erdgebundenheit meines Daseins, die Nähe der Natur), but which is 
at the same time absolutely foreign to me. For, nature is both what is close to 
me and an unapproachable element, the element of alterity which stands 
beyond all human possibilities (III, 175/154).65 Here again we can see 
existence lead toward transcendence. “It is our most important personality 
which is the root of our purest love for nature.” Inasmuch as nature is the 
other of existence, the element of alterity, it is the cipher through which I can 
grasp the always deeper ground on the basis of which I am. If existential 
philosophy were trapped in the domain of personality, it would be its own 
form of narrowness. There is an abandonment to which I am delivered and 
must be delivered by the very fact that I listen to what is other and 
irreducible to existence (III, 228/200). 
There is also the cipher of the human, or rather its ciphers, for, human 
beings can be interpreted as an idealist does, as consciousness in general, or 
as an anthropologist, a sociologist, or a theorist of spirituality does. All these 
ways of studying human beings should be united, but they are all surpassed 
by the self, for, one is always more than what one knows about oneself. 
Through the act of knowing oneself, the self becomes an other. The human is 
the being who knows itself, and in so doing, is the being who escapes from 
itself (cf. III, 186/163). 
 It is in humanity that Dasein gets tied together; for, the human being is 
nature, consciousness, history, and existence. It is the middle term where the 
extremes meet; “the world and transcendence entwine in man,” or put 
otherwise, the human being occupies the border between them.  
And yet, as we know, the human being is not self-sufficient. It indicates 
a transcendence. 
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This is why what it is to be human cannot be defined ontologically. The 
human being is a cipher for itself, a mystery for itself (III, 187/164). 
And more profoundly, beyond these ciphers which, in spite of their 
particulars, remain ciphers of nature and of the human, we arrive at the 
cipher of failure. Jaspers reminds us about the unattainable character of 
happiness (II, 367/320–21), about the death drive (which is foreign and 
hostile, but attracts me; this is sought out in order to experience what it is 
and to know how it feels to be in this foreign element—II, 44/41), and about 
the immense adventure of humanity that will fatally end in collapse (II, 
368/322). These observations lead us toward this cipher. The ultimate will 
be the cipher of failure:66 the failure of logic, antinomies, the collapse of 
thought; the failure of the objective study of the world, as a result of the 
essential tearing apart of being; the failure of action that cannot reach any 
consistent ideal and comes up against imbalances and injustices; the visible 
failure in limit-situations. And, in fact, these two ideas of failure and limit-
situations are connected. “If there were a clear solution to the question of the 
origin of sin, of struggle, and of evil in general, then there would be no limit-
situation” (III, 78/69). Our limit-situation is a situation of failure.67 It is a 
failure, first of all, because it escapes our knowledge; for, it is to the extent 
that we can solve essential problems that we exist most truly. Second, in a 
more general and deeper way, it is a failure because all of our positives are 
tied to negatives: “There is no good without a possible or real evil, no truth 
without falsehood, no life without death. Happiness is tied to pain, and 
realization to risks and losses. The human depth is tied to a destructiveness, 
sickness, or extravagance.68 In every Dasein, this antinomic structure can be 
seen” (III, 221/194).69 Above this failure of Dasein, I discover the failure of 
existence. There is no universality or harmony in existence, but everywhere 
there is antinomy and dilemma (III, 227/198). “Through my freedom, I am 
guilty in all cases; I cannot become completed in my totality. Moreover, my 
truth, instead of being stable and universal, is a truth delivered over to 
disappearance” (III, 221/194). As a result, all the values with which I 
identify when I am most myself are partial and ephemeral; freedom can only 
exist because there are these breaks in value and duration (III, 227/200). The 
appearance of being must therefore “take the form of a movement toward 
failure.” When being as an appearance attains one of its peaks in Dasein, “it 
will instantly recoil into disappearance in order to manifest the truth of its 
elevation. For it would be lost if it persisted. Every perfection will always be 
lost; every authenticity is either not yet or no more. One can only find it in 
the form of a vanishing limit between the way up to perfection and the way 
down from perfection. It is impossible to linger in perfection, and existence 
is only able to travel around this vanishing point. The instant as such is 
everything, yet it is only an instant” (III, 227/199). In the lines cited above, a 
feeling emerges that follows the steps of thought or art towards an acme and 
that appreciates each one of these steps, but, at the same time, sees them 
evaporate over the course of this progress, by a sort of decadence subtly 
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attached to progress, which accounts for the charm of first attempts. 
Imperfection contains the seeds of the life of perfection; but, what led up to 
it dies with perfection. Once a masterpiece is completed, this authenticity 
that appeared in the movement toward the masterpiece is destroyed, and 
decadence begins with this triumph.70 
The gods quickly take from the world those who are most dear to them. 
What is lasting, is what is inferior. Everything that has consistency 
dissipates.71 
Existence as freedom can never subsist in Dasein. Freedom exists to the 
extent that it seeks to acquire subsistence. But, if it were acquired, freedom 
would cease to exist. To be complete would be for freedom to extinguish 
itself. Maturity is at the same time aging. 
This annihilation of value in duration is linked to the very possibility of 
freedom. The disappearance of Dasein is the appearance of the being of 
transcendence. The spirit [L’esprit] is in the instant (III, 227/200, 223/195), 
that is, in what has no permanence. 
And, while freedom can indeed only exist though nature, at the same 
time it can only exist against nature. There is freedom only if there is 
resistance. Within ourselves, we feel an obscure nature, an irrational and 
foreign ground, with which the self must struggle, and which, sometimes, as 
in the case of mental illness, breaks down all barriers and leads to my 
destruction. This dark ground remains, even when I tame and master it; it is 
both a threat and a source of energy; it is what gives me strength. This is 
why my freedom struggles against the nature from which it departs. If it 
refuses this struggle, it disappears as freedom. If it gives in to it, it 
disappears as Dasein. It is threatened from every direction, and even 
threatened from within itself (III, 228/200, 229/201). That is the antinomy of 
freedom. Freedom is thus doomed to fail. 
The limit-situations in which existence is situated become ciphers of the 
collapse of existence. Death signifies that disappearance is constitutive of the 
idea of existence. Suffering and struggle signify that the positive is related to 
the negative. Sin signifies that all existence is limited. 
Because I am a given for myself and because what Jaspers calls the 
clarification of existence fails, I must make an appeal to transcendence. But 
yet I cannot escape from the fate of failure. I am confronted with the failure 
of the cipher, which, as we have seen, is essentially ambiguous and 
essentially unstable. And I am confronted with the failure of transcendence 
itself, since transcendence is indeterminate and the desire for transcendence 
will be manifested in the form of the passion of the night (III, 215/188, 
220/194, 221/195). Although we may climb towards transcendence, we are 
always heading toward failure. 
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This is not to say that I should give up trying. Quite the contrary, in 
order for the cipher of failure to have a meaning, I must try to escape from 
failure with all my might. Otherwise, my thought of failure would remain 
an abstract thought (III, 225/198). It needs to be filled by my efforts and my 
hollowed out victories, just as not-knowing is enriched by all the progress 
and all the defeats of knowledge. The result of existential struggle cannot be 
anticipated. “It is only by suffering in front of the inexorable face of Welt-
dasein, and in the incommunicability of existential communication, that 
existence can achieve what it would only be absurd to plan or to wish: to 
experience being through failure” (III, 237/208). 
And yet these characteristics of failure and of the ephemeral passage of 
time will be able to be transformed into something real and positive;72 and 
we will see here an attempt that is quite similar to that of Heidegger, when 
he speaks of being-toward-death and of resoluteness. As with Heidegger, 
this effort is surely inspired by a reflection on the Kierkegaardian notion of 
repetition and may also be open to criticism for the very same reason. 
“Destruction and the loss of oneself turn into being, when they are 
freely embraced. Failure which was only understood as something 
contingent, as the failure of my Dasein, becomes an authentic failure” (III, 
222/195). Here, I go beyond my vital being that wants to endure and hold 
on to what is durable. I can accept what happens to me; I welcome failure 
and the loss of the self. I understand that everything with value is fleeting; I 
can grasp what does not remain; I can grasp it even in its loss. “In an act of 
clear-sighted patience, I can experience the fact that what is fully present is 
not lost” (III, 223, 225/195–96). I become free by becoming aware of the 
necessity of failure. As for myself, I am broken as Dasein, I disappear as 
existence. At the same time, by a kind of reversal of the positive and the 
negative, what was once an obstacle becomes meaningful (II, 373/325).73 
The will for eternity, instead of rejecting failure, seems to find its 
purpose in failure itself (III, 222/195). Here we need to emphasize this 
notion of eternity. We have seen that failure can turn into freedom; now we 
will see that the ephemeral can turn into the eternal. For this to happen, 
what first needs to be explained is that every present includes memory and 
anticipation. Every deep perception appears as a memory; every deep 
decision is an act in which I call myself back to what I am. “Memory 
becomes a cipher, a revelation of being. I remain in the real, but I know it as 
having been. Memory is the awareness of the depth of the present and of the 
depth of the past” (III, 208/183). One could say that I become aware of the 
depth of the present as past and of the past as present. In addition, I am also 
always reaching toward my future; anticipation is the active possibility of 
this future. But, when they are taken separately, memory and anticipation 
tend to erase the present. Memory provides us with an enduring time in 
which there are no longer any decisions. Subsequently the present is 
deprived of its being; it is nothing but a passage between the past and 
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future. It only appears as what is no longer or what is not yet — a fallen 
present.74 Due to a failure in the reading of ciphers, the past and the future 
have been separated. This is why the present has lost its value (III, 211, 
212/185). Memory will not truly be deep and phenomena like “déjà vu” will 
not have any meaning, unless there is union between memory and 
anticipation (III, 209/184). Then, what is remembered is at the same time a 
phenomenon capable of being acquired in anticipation and prediction (III, 
207/181). In a sense, I choose the past; the past is a material that can be 
shaped and whose possibilities are never exhausted (III, 208/182). I will then 
have the feeling of being someone who, as past, comes to myself through the 
future, or of a being who I remember through anticipation. There is an 
understanding of the future by memory (I, 268/274). “The movement [élan] 
toward being in the grasping of what comes to me through the future is a 
unification of this future as being with which I have been tied forever and 
always. We have the feeling both of an absolute novelty of which we have 
no image and no representation; and the feeling of something entirely 
ancient; for it has been in me forever.” When a memory is filled with 
foresight and decision, when there is such a union of the present and the 
past, the present no longer remains simply the present; it becomes eternal 
presence (III, 207/181). It will then form a lived system of being that is self-
enclosed, provided that the meaning of the word “system” excludes any 
idea of knowledge and also provided that this vision of the atemporal is not 
detached from time; for, it can only be seen on the basis of time (III, 
212/186). The eternal is posited, so to speak, by way of temporality; and it is 
only present as a cipher, an ambiguous cipher that we can spell out only on 
the basis of our temporal existence, through decision and fidelity (III, 
218/191). For philosophers, we have seen that existence is always either past 
or future (I, 268/274), that wisdom is either the owl of Minerva or the 
prophetic dove. But, up above them, embracing the different instants in a 
single act, there is the circling of the eagle. 
Underlying Jaspers’s theory, we see a procession that includes the 
memory described by Novalis in Heinrich von Ofterdingen as déjà vu and the 
appeal to the future both old and new, Proust’s time lost and regained, 
Nietzsche’s eternal return, Kierkegaard’s repetition, and Heidegger’s past 
that is to come. 
This can help us to understand what Jaspers sometimes calls a “second 
language”; for, as with Heidegger and even, in a certain sense, Kierkegaard, 
“the paths toward the clarification of existence lead us to a point from which 
we will be able to return to reality.” Reality itself will become mythical: 
entirely transformed and saturated with transcendence. Van Gogh’s 
paintings, with their lyrical realism, provide an example of this (III, 
197/173). Subsequently, we are faced with the fact. In its mysteriousness, the 
fact both reveals and conceals at the same time. We are presented with a 
new feeling: the possibility of the real and the reality of the possible. “Dasein 
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is such that the real is possible, and being is such that Dasein is possible.” “In 
surprise, in hate, in trepidation and in despair, in love and in movement 
[élan] one sees: that’s the way it is” (III, 134/117). As a cipher, Dasein is 
absolute presence and absolute historicity. We are beyond knowledge: “The 
solution is not an object of knowledge; it is in the being that remains hidden. 
This being looks in the face of the one who, at his own risk, approaches him” 
(III, 223). We are presented with what is happening here and now, inasmuch 
as it cannot be turned into something general (III, 172/151). There are two 
ways of understanding the real: either it can be known and explained by 
causes and laws, and such explanations can be pushed as far as one wishes; 
or, it can be seen in its immediate revelation as a cipher, as a miracle (III, 
172/151). Here the movement, by which we said that thought suppresses 
itself, is continued and completed (III, 137/120). We are faced with the 
world as a fact. “We cannot know why there is a world. Perhaps we may 
experience it in failure, perhaps, but it is no longer something we can say... 
Only silence is possible” (III, 234/205). At its darkest point, the growing 
assurance of transcendence may renounce the language of transcendence 
and remain confined to being (III, 236/207). Below the descending dialectic, 
which is impossible, and even below the ascending dialectic, we discover the 
real. 
It is when thought annihilates itself or speaks to say nothing that the 
methods of negative ontology take on their full meaning. One arrives at the 
simple consciousness of being, the assurance of being; one experiences 
being, and this can only be expressed by a statement without content: It is 
(III, 233/203). “None of the formulas that can be used here say anything. 
They all say the same thing, and it is as if they said nothing; for they are 
ruptures of silence that are unable to break it” (III, 237/207). 
We stand beyond anxiety. “Simple anxiety like simple rest covers over 
reality with a veil. It is the fundamental fact of our existence in Dasein that 
reality cannot be seen in its authenticity without having anxiety, but also not 
without a passage from anxiety to rest,” (III, 235/207), not without this 
infinite process that continually goes from the one to the other. 
The cipher of failure and the cipher of the miracle come to complete 
each other.75 The failure of all thought, for Jaspers who here transposes 
Kierkegaard’s view, places us in the presence of the miracle. The ultimate 
cipher remains that of failure, for, it is only through failure that we are able 
generally to see the world of ciphers. Failure is the ground of the cipher’s 
whole being. Everything that I have allowed to settle into the experience of 
failure can come back again as cipher (III, 234/206). And failure itself is a 
victory, if what we have in the fleeting and almost lost instant is the vision of 
fulfillment (III, 236/207). 
This is where the three ciphers that Jaspers sees everywhere are 
reunited: the cipher of failure, the cipher of eternity, and the cipher of the 
J e a n  W a h l  |  2 4 9  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 1 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.717 
miracle. They are closely related to each other: because every cipher is a 
failure insofar as it escapes us and also a miracle insofar as it is presented to 
us in this flight. To affirm failure, to affirm the miracle, and to affirm eternity 
and the passage of values, are three different ways of affirming the world of 
ciphers. 
I have not tried to summarize all of Jaspers’s work here; instead I have 
only considered a few aspects of it and have shed light on some of his 
essential ideas. Perhaps this is enough to provide a sense of its richness and 
to give a sense of how it connects to some of my own deepest concerns. The 
image of the world torn apart is the basis on which the theory of existence is 
developed. What is appealing to me about this is perhaps especially the 
assertion of the connection of existence with what surrounds and exceeds it. 
First of all, it is tied to its background or rather its obscure substrate, which 
is impermeable to the intellect but is felt to be the basis of ourselves and 
things. Second, existence is linked with the heterogeneous. Third, it is linked 
with how existence is given to itself. For Jaspers resolves the problem of 
choice through a completely experimental dialectic in which choice and 
possibility are transformed before our eyes into non-choice and facticity.76 
What we truly choose is ultimately what is dictated to us. Fourth, and 
finally, the connection between existence and transcendence comes to 
appear more clearly; there is a vision of the self, at the limit of the self, on the 
border of transcendence and on the border of the other. Along with this 
relation to the infinite other, the value of existence is tied to its own finitude. 
Here Jaspers makes an attempt to establish a sort of qualitative logic where 
the acuity of a deep feeling is preferred over the weight of broader 
considerations, where addition no longer has any sense, and where less is 
more. The same efforts are continued and deepened by the theory of 
transcendence, where choice is transformed increasingly into non-choice, 
and where there is a glimmer of this unthinkable idea of something that is 
absolutely one but yet many. We are launched into pursuit of this idea by 
the very fact that we exist. 
 The theory of failure, of the eternally ephemeral and of the miracle, are 
all points of connection between Jaspers’s theory and my own metaphysical 
concerns. They are all ideas in which we can recognize something of a 
contemporary spirit, with its discouragement, its desire for intensity, its 
need to find substitutes for the absolute, its aspiration for a reality that is as 
beautiful as myth and that it would create on its own, and this negative 
ontology which inspires it. One could say that Jaspers’s reflection is situated 
in a place where some of the most eternal and most real philosophical 
problems are located, although not all philosophers have been aware of 
them. 
But precisely after having noted so many points on which we tend to 
agree with Jaspers and so many reasons to be interested in his philosophy, 
do we not come to have some distrust of this interest? Do we not find in it 
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the worship of some idols that we would like to forge for ourselves? The 
idea of the instant, this idea of the union between the present and the past in 
an eternal instant, is indeed a myth in Jaspers’s sense of the term.77 The same 
goes for the assertion that can be found in Nietzsche as well as in 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Jaspers, that one should take upon oneself 
what one is. Is the idea of transcendence itself sufficiently proved by the 
failure of immanence? There is a place that has been set for the Other, but 
the existence of the Other has not been proved. And how is this 
transcendence characterized? We cannot say anything about it, except that 
possibility and choice do not exist in it.78 But then, we are faced with a 
negative ontology, which is a very alluring abyss, a vertiginous abyss, but at 
the same time a very convenient refuge. One can also ask whether the idea 
of transcendence is not the product of one of these objectifications or 
determinations that Jaspers denounces. As for the idea of the world of 
ciphers, it still remains quite vague. It consists, ultimately, of saying that one 
is faced with the fact of the world as representing a transcendence that has 
not been proven and remains inaccessible. As a result, Jaspers’s entire effort 
amounts to telling us that it is necessary to accept the world as a fact, just as 
he has already told us that it is necessary to be what one is. 
It is not that this claim is illegitimate. But the poet, the lover, and the 
believer are also situated within this vision toward which Jaspers points the 
difficult path. By the very fact that the philosopher can only reach this vision 
by starting from a point that is situated outside of it, the philosopher 
acquires a greater worth. But is this vision intensified? This is the question 
that needs be asked. Pascal, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard are able to reach 
more tragic depths. They appear, if this word can still be used, far more 
existential than does a philosopher of existence. And the very pathos which 
comes from this dialectic is not denied to them: the dialectic never loses its 
rights, and its flame reignites among such thinkers to flame even their belief 
and even the flickering of this flame. 
That is perhaps not the most serious defect of this fine attempt. It is 
perhaps in the very idea of the philosophy of existence. A philosophy of 
existence into which so many various givens enter, where such a vast 
intellect is in play, is the negation of existential thought:79 for existential 
thought is narrowness and an intensity based on narrowness. There is thus 
perhaps a contradiction in the very idea of a philosophy of existence.  
 This can be felt especially in certain passages. When Jaspers thinks 
that combat can have a meaning, which is otherwise unattainable for us (II, 
374–403), when he recommends an attitude of respectful tolerance (III, 
113/100), when he tries to make the philosophy of existence as open and 
wide as possible (III, 228/201), one might wonder whether he does not re-
establish himself on an intellectual plane that he had in fact exceeded. The 
same could be said when he talks about the idea of sin, the sin of limitation, 
as if to escape from sin it were necessary to be on the plane of universality.80 
J e a n  W a h l  |  2 5 1  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 1 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.717 
Could one not say that he did not follow the movement of this dialectic that, 
faced with the problem of choice, led him to see the idea of choice vanish, 
and that, here too, it would have led him to see the idea of sin disappear,81 
so that nothing but the idea of limitation would remain? Yet, this idea too 
perhaps only has a meaning in relation to the idea of an abstract universality 
and would ultimately disappear, in turn. 
This is why the entire effort of this agile, expert, penetrating, sometimes 
profound intellect—who is eager to approach things that he does not 
understand, who is open enough to negate himself and see the obscure areas 
which surround him, who seeks to leave nothing out of what he considers to 
be the tragedy of existence—still does not satisfy us. This so vielseitig [many-
sided] defense of Einseitigkeit [onesidedness] cannot be content with either 
the Vielseitigkeit [many-sidedness] of the dilettante or the Einseitigkeit of the 
enthusiast. Perhaps that is the fate that the philosopher has to “take upon 
oneself.” But perhaps it is also the case that the obscure ground on which we 
want to shed light while being respectful of its obscurity refuses even this 
small ray of light. Or perhaps it is the case that this light is too weak or too 
calm. Perhaps existence does not let itself be seen by the glow of the lamp of 
love or by the glow of the lamp of the intellect, but only by the flash of a 
thought similar to the existential thought of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and 
some poets. But this judgment about Jaspers’s philosophy is certainly not a 
condemnation of the intuition of existence which is at its origin, which is its 
originary intuition. Even if, while admiring it, this judgment condemns a 
part of his intellectual effort (written in the margins of life and of reflection 
on some passionate thinkers), this would be all the more reason to condemn 
the task of the commentator that I have taken up here in order to enrich our 
own thinking by contact with a thought that is so rich, and to note my 
esteem for it.82 
Translated by Scott Davidson 
                                                                
 
[Originally published as “Le Problème du choix: L’existence et la transcendance dans la philosophie 
de Jaspers,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 41, 3 (July 1934), 405–44; republished in Jean 
Wahl, Études kierkegaardiennes (Paris: Fernand Aubier, 1938), 510–52. An abridged version of 
this translation will appear in Jean Wahl, “The Problem of Choice: Existence and Transcendence 
in Jaspers’ Philosophy” (abridged) in The Selected Writings of Jean Wahl Reader, eds. Alan D. 
Schrift and Ian Alexander Moore (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016).] 
 
1 [Wahl cites references from Karl Jaspers, Philosophie, 3 vols. (Berlin: Springer, 1932); his 
references will appear in parenthesis in the body of the text followed by the page reference to 
the English translation: Karl Jaspers, Philosophy, 3 vols., trans. E.B. Ashton (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1969, 1970, 1971). When only one page reference appears, this reference is to 
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the German text, as the corresponding passage in the English text has not been located. In our 
translation, we provide an English translation of Wahl’s French translation of Jaspers's German, 
which will often differ significantly from the published English translation of Jaspers’s 
Philosophy.] 
2 Here one might recall Emile Boutroux’s philosophy of contingency. 
3 Cf. Gabriel Marcel, Journal Métaphysique [(Paris: Gallimard, 1927)], 42, 64, 98. [English 
translation: Metaphysical Journal, trans. Bernard Wall (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), 41-42, 
63-64, 98-99; Wahl also refers to p. 418 of the French, which does not exist and has therefore 
been deleted.] I have tried, in these notes, to indicate points where Marcel’s attempt connects 
with that of Jaspers. (I have also noted the connections between Jaspers and Kierkegaard which 
can be explained by a direct influence.) Marcel had a sense of these connections. See his article, 
“Situation fondamentale et situations limites chez Karl Jaspers,” Recherches philosophiques 2 
(1932/33): 322, 326. [English translation: “The Fundamental and ultimate situation in Karl 
Jaspers,” in Gabriel Marcel, Creative Fidelity, trans. Robert Rosthal, preface by Merold 
Westphal (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 227–28, 231. Unless otherwise noted, all 
of Wahl’s subsequent references to Marcel will be to this article in Recherches philosophiques. 
Page numbers to the French will be given first, then, followed by a slash, to the English 
translation.] 
4 Cf. similar formulations in Kierkegaard. 
5 Cf. Marcel, 344/249–50, 347/252–53. [Following the footnote indicator, Wahl added the following 
to the version of the essay that appeared in Études kierkegaardiennes: “One will encounter 
failure everywhere; from what is thought, one cannot deduce the thought; from the individual, 
one will not be able to deduce the whole; from reason, one will not be able to deduce the 
irrational, and the inverse operations will not be possible either.”] 
6 [Here and in what follows, ‘existential’ translates the French ‘existentiel.’] 
7 On the contrast between Jaspers and Hegel, see some indications in my talk to the Congrès 
hégélien de Rome sur Hegel et Kierkegaard (1934). [Cf. Chapter Four: “Hegel and 
Kierkegaard.”] 
8 As Georges Gurvitch has pointed out, the word “existence,” which Heidegger and Jaspers borrowed 
from the philosophy of Kierkegaard, seemed particularly useful to them to avoid the appearance 
of subjectivism of words like: “consciousness” and “subject.” It refers, for that matter, to a 
completely different conception.  
9 Cf. Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, and “The fundamental and the ultimate situation in Karl 
Jaspers.”  
10 [The text incorrectly cites II, 166.] 
11 Marcel, Journal Métaphysique/Metaphysical Journal, 147/147-48, 278/287. 
12 See our later remarks on the evanescent character of transcendence. 
13 In order to satisfy the desire of those who would like a definition of existence and who would ask 
us to make a distinction, for instance, between existence and the consciousness of existence, 
this could bring us to propose a definition like this: existence is consciousness of existence 
inasmuch as it refuses consciousness. [Wahl added the following paragraph to the body of the 
text here in the version that appeared in Études kierkegaardiennes: “Thus, as a set of 
determinations, as universal thought (logically expressible), as spirit (expressible as a totality), 
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there is something deeper behind ourselves, which is existence. Here it is no longer a question 
of universality or of totality but of authenticity and uniqueness. It is no longer a question of 
intelligibility but of unintelligibility, of a thinking unintelligibility. There is always in the one 
who is thinking something that goes beyond what one thinks.”] 
14 Marcel, 344/249–50. 
15 [Wahl added the following two sentences here in the version that appeared in Études 
kierkegaardiennes: “It is in this sense that it is tied to reason. Existence seeks to understand 
itself but never understands itself completely.”] 
16 On the deep relations between the idea of the possible and the idea of existence in Jaspers, see 
Marcel, 321/226–27. 
17 Cf. Marcel, 345/250–51. I only have access to myself in the limit-situations of antinomies.  
18 See Marcel, 325/230. Cf. Kierkegaard’s theory of the instant. 
19 On the theory of situations and their inexhaustible character, see Marcel, 317/222–23, 330/235, 
332/237–38. 
20 Cf. Kierkegaard, Journal, July 4, 1840: “On the unity of the contingent and the eternal.” 
21 On Jaspers’s theory of limit situations, see the beautiful pages by Marcel, 336–44/241–50. 
22 [Wahl added the following paragraph here in the version that appeared in Études 
kierkegaardiennes: “But how would we know that we have truly entered into this domain of 
existence and of transcendence? In reality, we cannot know it; we can only be entered into it. 
There is a struggle here between knowing and being, and it is no longer a question of knowing 
but of being.”] 
23 Cf. the role of the idea of sin in the Kierkegaardian feeling of existence. On the relation between 
limit-situations and existence, see Marcel, 331/236. 
24 [Wahl added the following footnote here in the version that appeared in Études 
kierkegaardiennes: “Cf. Karl Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (Berlin: Julius Springer, 
1919), 278–80: to decide, to act is to limit oneself.” The corresponding pagination of the more 
widely available 2nd edition (1922) and its unchanged successors is 315–17.] 
25 Marcel, 320/225–26. 
26 Cf. the idea of the unification of the self in Kierkegaard. 
27 [Here Wahl mistakenly references II, 477.] 
28 [Here Wahl seems to cite the wrong volume. Wahl references II, 242, but it is likely that he is 
referring to I, 242 based on the subsequent references to volume I.] 
29 Cf. Marcel, 331/236–37. 
30 Cf. Kierkegaard, Papers X A428: “The fact that there is no choice is the expression of passion, of 
the immense intensity with which one chooses.” 
31 Cf. Kierkegaard’s theory of the dilemma. 
32 This shows the error of polytheism and of all philosophical doctrines comparable to it. “Multiple 
gods justify everything that I can be. When the one circulates in the small coin of the multiple, 
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it is no longer unconditional” (III, 122/108). In polytheism, there is no struggle within 
transcendence; there is no eternal decision. 
33 [Wahl mistakenly references I, 158 instead of II, 158.] 
34 Cf. Marcel, 335/240–41. 
35 [Wahl incorrectly references II, 118 instead of volume III.] 
36 There still remains a difficulty, however; for Jaspers tells us that if I only think the determinate 
through a limitation of what is more general, I remain in objective considerations. “Finite 
reality is only called determinate from the point of view of the general … It is only from the fact 
of our fundamental situation that our character appears as a characterization of something more 
general than itself” (II, 210/185). 
37 Marcel writes (348/254): “but how ignore the fact that this ineradicable guilt which is coessential 
with us, represents the trace or abstract vestige of original sin?” It seems, however, that on this 
point, one can make the same reproach against Jaspers’s philosophy as Heidegger’s. If what we 
have said is true, could one say that he has managed to free the metaphysical roots of the idea 
of sin, which could be called the spiritual materia prima (in the Leibnizian sense of the term) of 
the monads? It remains the case, however, that the word “sin” perhaps leads Jaspers to fall 
back into a conception that he surpassed, since it implies that not sinning would be to open 
oneself onto all possibilities. 
38 Cf. Marcel, 335/240: to experience being in what objectively would only be a limitation; and 
346/251–52: the failure of theodicy changes into a call for free activity. 
39 This formula is not found in Jaspers, but seems to express well (or at least extend) one of its 
tendencies. 
40 [Wahl refers to I, 296 here, but based on the preceding reference, it should be presumed as a 
reference to II, 296.] 
41 [Wahl added the following two paragraphs here in the version that appeared in Études 
kierkegaardiennes: “In this domain of communion, each existent will be aware of what is true 
for others even though it is not true for oneself. One should neither transform these truths into 
purely objective truths—for they would thereby immediately become erroneous—nor abandon 
one’s own truth, but live it intensely in its very narrowness and thereby in its depth. One must 
be oneself, without being able to call oneself either similar to others or different from others. 
For, in either case, this would be to compare oneself and thus to lose oneself. 
 That is to say that there is no explanation in this domain, but rather an invocation, a call from 
one existence to another existence. This is no longer an intellectual communication between 
individuals who can trade places (here Jaspers’s thought meets up with that of Marcel), nor a 
struggle for existence in the ordinary sense of the word, nor a harmony, but a community, a 
communion between irreplaceable ‘Uniques,’ a struggle for existence in the highest sense of the 
term, a struggle in which each progression of the one is a progression of the other, and a 
breakup of all being in front of transcendence.”] 
42 [Wahl mistakenly references III, 60 instead of III, 160.] 
43 Cf. Marcel, 332/237. 
44 [The page reference is not indicated by Wahl.] 
45 Cf. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death. 
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46 [Wahl added the following citations here in the version that appeared in Études 
kierkegaardiennes: “The reasonable cannot be conceived without the other, without the 
unreasonable. … What can embrace at the same time my particular determinations, universal 
thought, and the mind, refers to an other than myself. No being that is an object of knowledge 
is being. When I transform being into knowledge, transcendence escapes me. … Transcendence 
is the absolute horizon, which inexorably is but which is neither visible nor knowable” (I, 27). 
47 Cf. Kierkegaard, where the individual is “before God” rather than being in God. 
48 [Wahl added the following footnote here in the version that appeared in Études 
kierkegaardiennes: “Jeanne Hersch, in her book of such great interest, L’Illusion philosophique 
(Paris: Alcan, 1936), explains very well the sense of this idea of possibility (154).”] 
49 Cf. Marcel, 328/233. 
50 Cf. the link between subjectivity and objectivity, immanence and transcendence in Kierkegaard. 
51 Cf. the theory of communication in the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel. 
52 Cf. the idea of the secret in Kierkegaard and the idea of the secret, very different from that of 
Kierkegaard, in Marcel. 
53 In Kierkegaard, one can find this same idea of thought’s tendency toward its own self-destruction. 
54 Cf. Marcel, 346/251–52. 
55 [Wahl added the following clause here in the version that appeared in Études kierkegaardiennes: 
“we can only reach non-knowing by amassing the greatest possible amount of knowledge;”] 
56 [Wahl added the following paragraph here in the version that appeared in Études 
kierkegaardiennes: “Thus, I will attain transcendence by breaking from my ordinary ways of 
reasoning, by means of paralogisms, sophisms, the coincidences of opposites, and vicious 
circles.”] 
57 [Wahl added the following paragraph here in the version that appeared in Études 
kierkegaardiennes: “This awareness of failure, of non-reason, of uncertainty, and at the same 
time this welcoming of the other, is the very awareness that I have of my temporal and 
historical determination before transcendence.”] 
58 [Wahl’s reference here is to a parable on religion from Lessing’s Nathan the Wise.] 
59 Marcel, “aren’t we in a realm in which the categories of the one and the many are at once 
transcended, so that discourse itself becomes impossible?” [323/228] 
60 [The original mistakenly has this quote from II, 122.] 
61 [The original mistakenly has this quote from III, 221.] 
62 See Marcel, 322/227, 343/248–49, and my article “Sur D.H. Lawrence,” Nouvelle Revue française, 
42 (January 1934): 115–21. 
63 Cf. Paul Valéry, “Léonard et les philosophes,” Commerce XVIII (Winter 1928) [“Leonardo and the 
Philosophers,” in Collected Works of Paul Valéry, vol. 8: Leonardo, Poe, Mallarme, trans. 
Malcolm Cowley and James R. Lawler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 110–57], 
which has recourse to the same idea of the cipher. Cf. also see Paul Claudel, Art Poétique 
(Paris: Mercure de France, 1913), 164 [Poetic Art, trans. Renee Spodheim (Port Washington, NY: 
Kennikat), 106.]. 
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64 Cf. the theory of belief in Kierkegaard and likewise in Miguel de Unamuno; cf. also the theory of 
belief in Gabriel Marcel’s Metaphysical Journal. 
65 One can find the same duality of feelings toward nature in D.H. Lawrence. 
66 Cf. Louis Aragon, “Une vague de rêves,” Commerce II (Octobre 1924) [“A Wave of Dreams,” trans. 
Susan de Muth, http://www.surrealismcentre.ac.uk/papersofsurrealism/journal1/acrobat_files/deMuth.pdf]. 
Doubtless, we are asking about the abyss; but this great failure continues. 
67 Cf. Marcel, 346/251–52. [Wahl added here the following to this note in the version that appeared 
in Études kierkegaardiennes: “—Gabriel Marcel and Paul-Louis Landsberg, in the course of a 
discussion of Jaspers’s philosophy [Wahl is perhaps referring to the discussion that followed his 
presentation of “Subjectivity and Transcendence” to the Société Française de Philosophie;], rightly 
remarked that the word ‘failure’ perhaps does not evoke enough of the activity (relation to the 
subject) and of the objectivity (relation with the stumbling block) contained in the word 
Scheitern. This would rather be stranding, the fact of being beached, the shipwreck.”] 
68 Cf. Georges Bataille, “La notion de dépense,” Critique Sociale 7 (January 1933)[: 7–15. English 
translation: “The Notion of Expenditure,” in Visions of Excess: Selected Writings 1927–1939, 
translated and edited by Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 19/85), 116–
29.] 
69 Cf. Marcel, 345/250–51. Value is tied to the conditions that negate it. Opposites are so closely 
connected to each other that I cannot get rid of what I fight against … without losing the very 
thing that I wanted to protect as a reality. 
70 [Wahl added the following sentences at the beginning of the following paragraph in the version 
that appeared in Études kierkegaardiennes: “Communions and revelations can only be fleeting. 
They remain only for an instant; what is the highest in being is what is the most brief and the 
most fragile.”] 
71 Cf. Marcel, 336/241, 338/243–44, 346/251–52, 347/252–53. 
72 Cf. Marcel, 346/251–52. 
73 [Wahl added the following footnote here in the version that appeared in Études 
kierkegaardiennes: “Under failure (the shipwreck), there appears the presence of the stumbling 
block, of the other, that causes the shipwreck.”] 
74 Cf. the theory of the fallen present in Heidegger. [Wahl added the following here in the version 
that appeared in Études kierkegaardiennes: “On the relation between Heidegger and Jaspers, 
see among others, Gerhard Lehmann, Die Ontologie der Gegenwart [in ihren Grundgestalten 
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1933)], 22.”] 
75 They complete one another in an analogous way in Kierkegaard’s thought. 
76 Perhaps, in Volumes I and II, Jaspers insists too much on the aspect of creativity and the aspect of 
the possibility of existence. Or, at least, as we advance in his thought, the more we realize that 
activity gives way to something other than itself. In a sense, but only in a sense, this could be 
called passivity just as possibility gives way to pure facticity. The words action and passion 
remain unable to capture this fact that is at the same time both given and creative. 
77 [Wahl added the following here in the version that appeared in Études kierkegaardiennes: “but a 
myth which we can only believe in part.”] 
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78 Besides, can it be conceived without contradiction? Transcendence is what is one’s own without 
an other (III, 15/15); and at the same time, transcendence, God, does not occur without the 
human (III, 124/110, 164/144). It is true that there is nothing about this contradiction that is not 
reasonable in some sense: concerning transcendence, we cannot express ourselves without 
contradiction. 
79 We also note that from a practical point of view, Jaspers’s philosophy justifies everything. When 
Jaspers says that we should not betray our country, our parents, our love, because it would be 
to betray ourselves (II, 245), that reflects a very deep tendency in Jaspers’s thought. I must 
reconcile the self, and my concrete self, with the givens from which I am derived and somehow 
unify them with myself. But there is also a deep tendency within him to take the side of 
heretics. Have Polybius and Saint Paul (II, 402/350), the one who denied Hellenism and the 
other who denied Judaism, demonstrated fidelity in the sense in which this word was first 
defined? How should we respond to the question: can I change myself or must I accept myself? 
(Cf. II, 125/109–110). We are thus divided between these two tendencies. Jaspers will say that it 
is necessary to remain in a sort of tension between preservation and destruction (III, 99/90–91). 
This is only a solution in words, which cannot be used in practice. 
To say that we must remain in the religion of our forefathers, but that we have to be heretics 
within that religion (this is the solution that Marcel highlights and criticizes on page 348 of his 
article), is still only a middle term at which it is difficult for the existent to stop definitively. To 
say that we must adopt the most geschichtlich [historical] solution is to say nothing (II, 
242/211); for one cannot know which solution is the most geschichtlich. To say that there are 
depths that no universal consciousness can enter is perhaps also to get out of this difficulty at 
too high of a cost. It is legitimate that a philosophy would have no practical consequence, but it 
is perhaps unjustifiable for it to seem to have one when it does not. One might reply, to be 
sure, that Jaspers’s philosophy does not command anything, that it thus demonstrates a truly 
existential tolerance, and that this is its ultimate virtue. 
80 The theory of sin, in Kierkegaard, seems to want to escape this reproach. For Kierkegaard, 
existence is both the highest value and sin. And this is explained by the essential paradox of 
Christianity. 
81 On this point, my critique rejoins the objection to Jaspers previously made by Marcel. 
82 [Wahl added the following lengthy footnote here in the version that appeared in Études 
kierkegaardiennes: “In her book L’Illusion philosophique (Paris: Alcan, 1936), Jeanne Hersch 
helps us to grasp, in a precise and penetrating way, the essence of this philosophy when she 
says: ‘To clarify the flight of the essential from the clutches of our research, that is certainly 
the internal gesture, constantly repeated, of Jaspers’s philosophy.’ [163] 
 “And she shows very well how, for Jaspers, philosophy ends at an impasse. Perhaps, even though 
I doubt that she herself would accept this explanation completely, one could try to explain this 
by making use of the distinction that she makes between the attitude of the student and that of 
the author who is studied. ‘For the author, the activity goes from the will to being, by unfolding 
and laying itself out, by taking possession of the world of objects, up to the completely 
formulated system. For the student, the system is given and thus the activity consists of 
entering into the spiral, of connecting what is developed and externalized there, in order to 
reach a simple, voluntary, and free core whose subject will be revealed.’ [70] For, could it not 
be said that Jaspers adopts the attitude of the student (of a student who is entirely worthy of 
being a professor, a great professor)? Kierkegaard said of Hegel: That is not a philosopher, that 
is a great professor. Could one not say the same thing about Jaspers, the anti-Hegelian? Twice, 
thanks to the phenomenology of spirit the first time and thanks to the psychology of 
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Weltanschauungen [‘worldviews’] the second time, the human spirit sought to replace 
philosophy with an activity that is slightly different from it, and at its basis, that activity is a 
reflection on the history of philosophy, though it differs in each case. The world of Hegel is of a 
single piece, although it is a moving one; the world of Jaspers is broken. In spite of their 
fundamental differences, there is still something common between the attitudes of the two 
thinkers. 
 “But Hegel still keeps a ciphered, mysterious language. Hersch says: ‘No philosophy has ever 
been as transparent to itself’ [184] (than that of Jaspers). But this is only because it has no 
other object than the destruction of its object. (And can one even call this destruction of the 
object an object?)  
“One could formulate the problem posed by Jaspers’s philosophy in the following way: What is the 
philosophical value of the sentence: one cannot philosophize without sinking into a reality such 
that one cannot pronounce sentences like: one cannot philosophize without sinking into a reality 
such that one cannot state [or pronounce] sentences of the type, etc…? In other words, is there 
not a contradiction in saying that there can only be a philosophy of the particular, when this 
proposition itself can only have meaning if there is a general philosophy. In still other words, is 
it possible to be Pascal and the psychologist of Weltanschauungen at the same time? 
 “This, as Hersch will say, is the circle, the circle whose presence indicates transcendence. 
 “It still remains to be known whether Jaspers has created a logic of philosophy in general, 
rather than a philosophy. This logic cannot entirely reach the reality of philosophy such as it has 
been conceived up to now. It says about the scholastics: what they had to express was 
inexpressible otherwise than by a cipher. For, the effort of both Jaspers and Hersch is to express 
without ciphers the necessity of the cipher and even what is inexpressible otherwise than by a 
cipher. 
“One can perhaps still find ciphers in Jaspers’s work and in Hersch’s book; for example, the 
waterfall is a cipher inasmuch as it reveals ‘the compact and opaque thickness of matter.’ [47] 
But, it is precisely at that moment that the author ceases being a philosopher of existence (for 
whom this opacity would only have sense in relation to him- or herself and would ultimately 
vanish) in order to become an existence. 
 “In speaking about Nietzsche, who demands and seeks the creation of myths, she writes: ‘Myth 
would have to be able to be reborn, perhaps by a spontaneous creation, by play, but never in 
response to a recognized need, demonstrated by reason. However paradoxical this idea might 
seem, I believe that Nietzsche finished the work of Socrates, of the Socrates he understood, 
denounced and battled.’ [141] One can ask oneself if Jaspers’s role is not to have continued this 
destruction of idols, and even of the gods, that was begun by Socrates and almost finished by 
Nietzsche, and to make increasingly difficult these ciphers whose necessity he shows to us at the 
same time.”] 
